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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH GUENTHER JORGENSEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Case No. 16193 
vs. 
RAY LYNN JORGENSEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Fourth Judicial District 
Court wherein the Honorable J. Robert Bullock, District 
Judge, heard a contested divorce on a complaint and 
counterclaim involving paternity and custody of children, 
and the acquisition and division of real and personal 
prop~rty. The court awarded real property acquired after 
the separation of the parties to respondent and divided 
the per son a 1 property, including the balance of the 
!JTSPOST'I'ION PJ LO;ii·:R COURT 
f'<·o·'[H>ndc nt l·:as '-Jl':ll1t.<'d a d i vonce on his counterclaim 
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children, age 3, the real property, and one-half of the 
personal property. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed 
by this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were ~arried to each other at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, on the 17th day of August, 1972, and there-
after, respondent tolerated an unfaithful wife who dated 
other men and had at least two affairs during the period 
of the marriage (Find. No. 7, R-P.25). The second child 
was born May 25, 1978, approximately one month prior to 
the separation of the parties at a time when appellant 
was h~ving an affair with another man and under circum-
stances where nobody knew for sure who the father of the 
child v1as. 
Though appellant alleged in her complaint that re-
spondent was the father, she privately advised respond-
ent he \vas not the father of Stacy Lynn Jorqcnsen and 
would not h~ve to pay child support for her. Ilccuusc of 
recent decisions relating to res judicuta and collateral 
estoppel, rL'SpOn<lcnt chose to call in question the 
paternity of SL1cy Lynn Joi-<JL'nscn ror the l'\li['<JSe of 
-'-
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obtaining blood tests and to pursue the legal rationale 
of Miller v. Marticorena (Utah), 531 P.2d 487 (1975). 
As stated in the Findings of Fact No. 3 (R-P.24), the 
trial judge invited counsel to the bench to advise the 
court on the scope of the paternity issue, at which time 
counsel for both parties advised the court that there was 
no issue as to the paternity of either child, respondent 
being not only satisfied, but extremely pleased with the 
results of the blood test, later admitted in evidence 
(R-P.88,114). The issue of paternity of Stacy Lynn 
Jorgensen was therefore not a result of the counterclaim 
of respondent, but rather, appellant's insistence that 
she not be saddled with respondent as the father of her 
youngest child, regardless of the blood test. It was 
appellant's position at the trial that her live-in boy 
friend (with whom she was having an affair during the 
marriage) is in fact the father of Stacy Lynn (R-P.67). 
There was a conflict in the evidence as to whether 
or not there was $4,200.00 in the bank at the time the 
parties separated, or $4,853.73 (R-P.67). Based upon 
the testimony of the parties and the evidence of bills 
palrt by respondent from that account, the court concluded 
that the account had $4,200.00 when the parties separated 
-3-
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and approximately $600.00 when the parties stipulated on 
an order to show cause that no further funds would be 
withdrawn from the account after payment of the repair 
bills due on appellant's car (R-P.SS, L.7-15, P.llO, L.4). 
After the parties separated and after respondent 
paid the bills incurred during the marriage (and prior 
to the divorce hearing), respondent elected to purchase 
real estate in accordance with preliminary arrangements 
made prior to the separation of the parties, and respond-
ent's parents were substituted in place of appellant by 
requirPment of the financing institution and to secure 
their loan of the down payment to responoent (R-P.52, 
L.l6). Appellant's statement that "the court awarded the 
house, tog0thcr with the $6,000.00 equity thereunder, to 
defenoant-responoent" has no evidenciary support except 
as an infer0nce from facts found otherwise by the court. 
ARGUI1EUT 
POINT I 
TilE m:CIS!Cl!J OF '''liE TPTAL CCll'ET TO PLliCE flRAD EAY 
,Tlll\f~l:l:St:;; \\IT!! J.:l:SPCJ:;nENT IS r'LJLLY ,n;s•r'JI'l ED BY 
'J'llE EVI n!:NCE PPJ:~;J:'NED l\'1' TP1 AL MJD THE LA\/ OF 
Tll IS S'l'i\'T'E. 
point nut to th~.--- nar t~1e1t L'.C.i'\ .. 30-3-10 dc-,t's not ,-,~~1-JlY 
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to divorce cases but is only applicable in cases of 
separation, and that the controlling statute is u.c.A. 
30-3-5. Sampsell v. Holt, 15 Utah 73, 202 P.2d 550 
(1949); Johnson v. Jonnson, 7 Utah 2d 263, 323 P.2d 
16 (1958). U.C.A. 30-1-5 provides: 
lfuen a decree of divorce is made, the court 
may make such orders in relation to the chil-
dren, property and parties, and the maintenance 
of the parties and the children, as may be equit-
able. The court shall have continuing juris-
diction to make such subsequent changes or 
new orders with respect to the support and 
maintenance of the parties, and custody of 
the children and their support and mainten-
ance, or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and necessary ••• 
Further, our statutes and case law allow the trial 
court "considerable discretion" in child custody matters. 
Rice v. Rice (Utah 1977), 564 P.2d 305. 
The record shows that after the birth of Brad Ray 
Jorgensen, respondent provided personal care and atten-
tion for said child equal to that of the mother (R-P.79); 
that respondent had made a special effort to take his 
son with him and to spend his spare time with his son, 
and that a close relationship existed between the father 
and the son (R-P.lOl); that respondent spent evenings 
at ho~e with his son while appellant was out of the home 
nn a pretext, but in iact having an affair with another 
-5-
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man (R-P.64); that the respondent took the responsibility 
for bathing, clothing, feeding, caring for and giving 
security to said child when the appellant chose to be 
elsewhere (R-P.78). 
On the other hand, the record shows that appellant 
spent evenings cooking in other men's apartments (R-P.71); 
dated other men (R-P.SO); had an affair with another man 
in Idaho Falls, Idaho (R-P.69); and had another affair 
with a man for about a year prior to her separation from 
respondent (R-P.64), who at the time of the divorce hear-
ing, was a live-in boy friend who she claimed to be the 
father of her youngest child (R-P.67, L.l); that she was 
considering moving to vlashington and taking the children 
with her (R-P.73, L.9); that like respondent, appellant 
was working and was taking the children to a baby-sitter 
during her regular hours oi employment (R-P.60, L.l5). 
The court was acting in the best interest of the child 
in concluding that the environment and lifestyle provided 
by appellant was not equal to that offered by respondent, 
but that appellant could qualify to be a fit and proper 
person for custody of Stacy Lynn. 
The Supn•r;1e Court's i nterpr0tat ion of the statute, 
and the oft-<JnnounrC'Il rule that "all things b0ing equol, 
-G-
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custody of children of tender years.should be placed 
with the mother" is hopefully designed to avoid habitual 
placement at the lowest acceptable standard of welfare 
services, rather than overlook the shortcomings of a 
mother just because she is the mother. Appellant alleges 
that because the trial court did not find her "unfit•, 
she is therefore entitled to a custody preference. But 
a finding of "unfitness" is the standard by which any 
court can take children away from any parent. The differ-
ence was clearly distinguished by the Supreme Court of 
Montana in Henderson v. Henderson (Hont.l977), 568 P.2d 
177, at Page 181: 
The "best interest of the child" test is cor-
rectly used to determine custody rights between 
natural parents in divorce proceedings. In 
this situation the "equal rights" to custody 
which both the father and mother possess ••• are 
weighed in relation to each parent's ability 
to provide best for the child's physical, 
mental, and emotional needs upon the breakdown 
of the marital relationship. "Fitness" of each 
parent is determined only in relation to the 
other and not to society as a whole. 
The Montana court then explained that where parties 
who are not parents seek custody of children, they must 
first show that the natural parents' conduct does not 
meet the minimum standards of child abuse, neglect and 
depcnclcncy statutes, and they must be found to be unfit 
-7-
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parents. Such was not the case here. The emotional 
instability of the appellant manifested by her desires 
for reconciliation and her reluctance to leave her live-
in boy friend (R-P.BS) contrasts rather markedly with the 
stability and reliability of respondent. The lifestyle 
of appellant could be severely damaging to a 3-year-old 
attempting to relate to a father image, though not so 
crucial to a 6-month-old baby. 
Appellant states in her brief at Page 12 that her 
former lifestyle and live-in arrangement are now moot in 
view of her affidavit and the changes she has made since 
the trial. Though such changes may be highly commend-
able, they are certainly after the fact and not part of 
the evidPnce upon which the trial judge could rest his 
decision, and for the same reason this honorable court 
cannot consider the alleged change of circumstances as 
bearing on the propriety of the trial court's decision. 
The trial court's (lPcision was based on the evi<lence at 
trial and not on the a11e~ations of an rlffidavit filed 
three TC~Onths later in connection \"ith this <1ppcnl. 
l'ncler the l'rron<>nus concept of "unfi tnc'Sc;" Lil'iJcllant 
cont cn(ls on ra,Jc 7 t)f ht'r l~:ie>f thot ''t iJP r'tOt ;l('r is 
Pntitled to t·hc ru:;toc1y of the c'hilc1 unlc,ss it is n-1de 
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to appear to the contrary". Such is not the law that has 
painstakingly evolved over the past thirty years in the 
State of Utah. A divorced mother is not entitled, as a 
matter of law, to custody of a child of tender years, 
merely because there is no showing that she is an improper 
or unfit person. Johnson v. Johnson, supra; Sampsell 
v. Holt, supra. The basic rule announced by the court 
in Hyde v. Hyde, 22 Utah 2d 429, 454 P.2d 884 (1969) 
and confirmed in Smith v. Smith (Utah 1977), 564 P.2d 
307, recognizes that the mother has no statutory prefer-
ence as suggested in 30-3-10, U.C.A., and its statutory 
predecessors, but confirms the concept that parents' 
rights to custody are equal under the law and that mother 
gets the preference only if the evidence before the court 
is equal or in her favor. The evidence before the trial 
court relating to appellant's lifestyle, her emotional 
instability, her possible removal from this state, and 
the general behavior of appellant in the marriage con-
stituted an evidenciary inequality that could not be 
iqnored by the trial judge, and because of that inequal-
ity appellant had no preference before the court, and the 
cotirt's ruling on custody does not offend the rule of law 
011unciated by the Supre~e Court of the State of Utah. 
-9-
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For these reasons the rationale of Baker v.__!laker, 
110 Utah 462, 175 P.2d 213 (1946) and the dictum from 
White v. White, 29 Utah 2d 148, 506 P.2d 69 (1973) quoted 
on Page 9 of appellant's brief serve only to strengthen 
respondent's position, though perhaps legally not applic-
able. The ~emonstrated lifestyle of appellant, to which 
she herself has testified, can hardly be compared with 
the relatively innocuous behaviour of Steiger v. Steiger, 
4 Utah 2d 273, 293 P.2d 418 (1956) or Stuber v. Stuber, 
121 Utah 632, 244 P.2d 650 (1952). Appellant further 
cites llf'ndccson v. Henderson (Utah 1978), 576 P.2d 1289 
on Page 10 of her brief, but the ~uote is not accurate, 
the last phr~so having been omitted, and it should read 
as follmvs: 
As to the issue of child custody, both parties 
rely on and cite substantially the same cases 
pn•viol!sly de>cicled by this court, ;ond while 
those ,.,J,;os clo ~c;tand 'or the proposition that 
e\:_<"_r_yt J::_ i ncLJ::o_~n_'} _ _£TJa J:_, pre f e rc•ncc s:wu] d be 
qiv0n to l!1c "1othcr in c1ctc>rf'1ininq c\lstody, 
thoy ,,] so say that the best inl0rests and \vel-
~.lrC' n7 t h0 c!1i lr1rcn is -t-})_o_ -c~~tf~J}-=_iJlq-­
',1-,c;-t-or. (crq>hasi s qi\'C'n) 
h'ith nnly sl iqht \'ariation, lhe S,l,~l·2 c>'~ncept \·.·as 
the h:1~~is fnr ,1c•( .. i~;inn in Hyde v. Hyrle, ~'22T_~, Rice 
v. r~i l .. t .... Stl~ r~~, Jill'' ~':ll-l': s \'. lltl!'li1~1l-l'~··s, ~ !J1-ra I ,]JJ(1 B~ :Jclr;.J.rl 
\'. ~i_;~·l_\~~~ ~t·tz1h ~t1 7~) 
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stated at Page 704: 
The plaintiff grounds her attack upon the order 
on the rule to which we agree as a general 
proposition: That it is presumed to be for the 
best interest and welfare of a child of tender 
years to be with her mother. However, under 
the modern trend of social thinking away from 
former fixed rigidities, toward equality of 
the sexes and greater flexibility in consider-
ing the qualifications of the parents on an 
individual basis, that presumption is sub-
oroinate to the higher rule that the paramount 
concern in such cases is the best interest and 
welfare of the child. 
The court concluded its opinion in Bingham with 
the following comment on Page 704: 
Inasmuch as the evidence does not clearly pre-
ponderate against the findings and order of 
the trial court, as would be required for 
reversal, but on the contrary seemed to clearly 
preponderate in favor of those findings, the 
order made is well within the prerogatives of 
the trial court in such matters. 
POINT II 
'1'H E COURT PRO!'ERL Y Al'll\RDED ·ro 1\PPELLJ\NT ONE-HALF 
OF THE ,JOINT SAVINGS ACCOUNT AFTER THE BILLS 
IlEnE PAID. 
Appellant was uncertain as to the time she checked 
the joint savings account, and her testimony under ques-
tioning by her attorney is on Pages 58 and 59 of the 
rcc:oro: 
Q. I "sked you to secure the balance or the 
cl n"c-nut of the ch<'cking acc:ount after you 
-11-
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were separated. What were the balances 
right before the 19th of June? 
A. 40-8 .•• 
Q. What were the exact figures that you gave 
back to me? 
A. Yes. It was $4,853.73. 
Q. That's the sum of money that was in the 
account? 
A. Yes. 
Q. On what day is that? Is that the 20th of 
June? 
A. Yes, 5/22. 
Q. Or the 20th day of !lay? 
A. Urn hum. 
Appellant testified under cross-examination that the 
account had a balance of $4,853.20 as of the 22nd day of 
l~y and that she did check the account when the parties 
separated in ,Tune but she couldn't remember what the 
bal.1nce v.·as at that time (R-P.67). On the other hand, 
re>sponnent testifien in no uncertain terms that he with-
<lrcw the sum of $4,2fl0.00 and pain the bills outstanding 
at t hat t inc ( R- P p . 53 , 54 ) . The ba 1 a:1ce in the acc-ount 
,1ftc>r payn0nt of the oills, e~nr1 partil'ULorly the bill on 
-1~-
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court with respect to that balance is fully set forth in 
the record at Page 110: 
THE COURT: I have concluded that I'm going to 
grant Mr. Lynn Jorgensen a decree of 
divorce on his counterclaim; further, 
that the home, there isn't any equity 
in the house, that the monies were 
expended in payment of family obliga-
tions with the exception of $600.00 
which is still left ••• 
In the findings of fact and the decree of divorce, 
that figure was adjusted to $653.00 to avoid the very 
onus that appellant now desires to put upon respondent 
on expenditure of some of the money for his personal 
utility bills after separation. 
It is also true that as compared with respondent's 
estimate, appellant undervalued the household furniture 
and furnishings by $753.00 (R-Pp.55,71; Pltfs. Exh. No. 
1). In every particular, respondent was more than equit-
able in his valuations and his reporting of assets. Had 
the court determined to divide the $4,200.00 equally as 
of the date of separation, the court likewise would have 
been free to divide the obligations as of the same date, 
and the result would have been exactly the same. 
Counsel for appellant had an opportunity to further 
,·xamine respondent as to any discrepancies between the 
-13-
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balance in the account and the total of the bills he 
testified he paid, and the failure to do so cannot now be 
laid to respondent's doorstep. 
Finally, the total of the bills paid by respondent 
is $3,571.44, and that figure deducted from the $4,200.00 
the trial court found to have been the amount withdrawn 
by respondent leaves a balance of $628.56, virtually the 
exact balance that respondent testified was in the account 
at the time of trial and available for division, and it 
would therefore appear that the figure of $737.50 set 
forth on Page 14 of appellant's brief is an error. The 
appellant cannot be serious in suggesting that the debts 
paid were any more respondent's debts than appellant's 
debts, espcci,1lly in view of the fact that a sizeable 
repair bill was paid on her car as the last withrlrawal 
from that account by agrccr,1ent of the parties at the order 
to show cause on the 14th day of July, 1978. While it 
is true that the tricll court's decision did operate to 
r<'li'-'VP l"l'Spnndent of debts inrurrod cluring the marria<Je, 
it also <'pc>ratc•d to n'l icve dppcll ant of any surh debts, 
,1ncl thc•rc is no <]LH'stion t·'1at app<•ll.1nt's co~Hluct in the 
fnunc1 l)y thl" t-ri,ll cnui·t. 
- l 
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Humphreys v. Humphreys (Utah 1974), 520 P.2d 193, 
cited by appellant, is hardly authority for the line of 
reasoning adopted by appellant. Contrary to the sugges-
tion of appellant, the trial court did not allow respond-
ent to spend any of the money·he withdrew. The spending 
took place and the debts were paid immediately after 
separation of the parties, and full disclosure was made 
to appellant and her attorney at the order to show cause 
hearing held the 14th day_ of July, 1978. The trial court 
si~ply recognized that by virtue of the payments made by 
respondent, the parties had no outstanding debts at the 
time of the divorce hearing, and the balance in the 
account was then equally divided by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The awarding of custody is no easier now than it was 
for Solomon, and whatever principles are used to deter-
mine custody, a loving person may be deeply wounded. To 
mjnimize the trauma to the chjld, the courts have long 
held that the best interest and welfare of the child is 
the paramount consideration. The court was justified 
f1·om the cviclcnce presented in considering the emotional 
inst~bility of the appellant, her lifestyle, the possi-
Lility of her removal to the State of Washington, and her 
-15-
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behavior in the marriage relationship to determine if all 
things were equal between the parties. Likewise, the 
court was justified from the evidence in considering the 
stability of the respondent, his unusually close rela-
tionship with his 3-year-old son, his interest in actively 
pursuing the role of a parent with said child, and his 
lifestyle and demonstrated conduct in the marriage. The 
evidence supports the court's conclusion that all things 
were not equal between the parties, and from the prepon-
derance of evidence the court was justified in placing the 
custody of the minor child with the respondent, recog-
nizing that su~h placer:1ent might be subject to change 
as conditions in the future may warrant. 
Further, the court's finding that the bank account 
less the balance remaining was used to pay joint obliga-
tions incurred during the marriage is fully justified by 
the evidence, and the order dividing the balance in the 
acco1111t bPtween the pe~rties and dividing the other per-
son,1l property Y.'as C<]llitable to appellant in the highest 
tleqr-ce consistent with the principles <JOVcrning divorce. 
I\c•sl'O!ldcnt's later d.ecisjon to borro\._' money [rom his 
J'-1n':lts ,lntl buy the hone as an in·_;c·s~_-,,'nt has nothing to 
do 1:ith .1ppellant bcc,Hrse of i1vr --,-nli'c·st <lisintccrcst 
-lG-
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and her waiver of participation by living elsewhere and 
demanding that half the bank account be paid to her in 
cash. And based upon such evidence, the court found 
that there was no equity in the home to which appellant 
was entitled, and there is no evidence to the contrary. 
1979. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of April, 
BEAtf, BEAN & SMEDLEY 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF HAILING 
I certify that on this ~~~day of April, 1979, I 
mailed two copies of Respondent's Brief to Gary L. Gale, 
Attorney for Appellant, Suite 205, The Legal Arts Build-
ing, 2568 l'l'ashington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84401, postage 
prepaid. 
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